To Merge or to Help Related Firms Merge? Vertical Mergers in Cournot Oilgopolies with Complementary Inputs(合并还是帮助相关公司合并?垂直合并在科诺寡头市场中的互补要素分析视角)

時間:2020-01-09         阅读:

光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第 5684 期

主題:To Merge or to Help Related Firms Merge? Vertical Mergers in Cournot Oilgopolies with Complementary Inputs(合并还是帮助相关公司合并?垂直合并在科诺寡头市场中的互补要素分析视角)

主講人:台湾政治大学 李文杰副教授

主持人:发展研究院 李丁副教授

時間:2019年1月16日(星期四)上午9:00-10:30

地點:西南財經大學柳林校區格致樓1102會議室

主辦單位:发展研究院经济学院 科研处

主講人簡介:

李文杰,现任台湾政治大学副教授。专长领域为宏观经济理论、公司金融和企业组织理论。已发表重要著作于Journal of Macroeconomics、International Review of Economics and Finance、Academia Economic Papers、Journal of Taiwan Land Research等重要学术期刊。

主要內容:

Consider a successive oligopoly where the production of a final good requires two complementary inputs: one essential input produced by a sole supplier and one generic input by oligopolistic suppliers. We compare the profitability of two kinds of strategies for the supplier of the essential input. One is to help related firms merge vertically and the other is to acquire a downstream firm itself. We show that it is in the interest of the key input supplier to subsidize a fraction of firms in the market to merge vertically when the number of related firms is small. This is because the subsidized mergers can trigger further vertical mergers and lead to the maximum number of pair-wise vertical mergers whereby the monopolistic supplier can grasp the bulk of the efficiency gains stemming from the elimination of double marginalization. In contrast, it is more profitable for the key input supplier to acquire a downstream firm and foreclose the other downstream competitors when the number of related firms is large. This is because now it is less costly for the key input supplier to acquire a downstream firm while it needs to subsidize more firms to achieve full integration.

本文利用互補要素模型分析科諾寡頭市場中垂直合並産生的誘因,並討論模型中存在的各種均衡市場結構。當上遊的中間材料由獨占廠商生産,另一種情況是由寡占廠商生産時,獨占的中間材料生産者的利潤會隨著垂直合並廠商家數增加而增加。其原因在于垂直合並的廠商消除了雙重加價而降低了生産成本,從而增加均衡産量並衍生對獨占的中間材料需求。由于獨占中間材料廠商可以從其他廠商的垂直並購中獲利,它甚至有誘因貼補其他廠商以促成垂直合並,使得産業均衡結構變成完全整合。本文亦支持垂直合並會促進效率的論點,並當有獨占勞工工會存在時,廠商進行産業垂直合並後會使得勞工工資上漲。因此本文結果可對反托拉斯法的垂直合並管制提供多元政策意涵,並對多要素投入的垂直相關市場有更全面的市場結構預測。